The right to a fair trial

Sources
The right to a fair trial which is applicable to the detention and the subsequent prosecution of alleged terrorists can be inferred from different sources. First, on the international level, it is guaranteed in the Geneva Conventions (GC), especially in their Common Article 3, in Articles 84-108 Third Geneva Convention (GC III) and Articles 64-78 Fourth Geneva Convention (GC IV). Second, human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the American Convention on Human Rights 5 (ACHR) and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 6 (ADRDM) or -here ratione loci not applicable -the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 7 (ECHR), the Arab Charter on Human Rights 8 (AChHR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 9 (AChHPR) all make provision for fair trial guarantees. Third, the right to a fair trial is granted in national constitutions such as the United States Constitution (in particular the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment).
Content
The right to a fair trial is an umbrella right encompassing several sub-rights of any person who is subjected to criminal proceedings, 10 such as: -the right to equality of arms before a court, which has to be competent, independent, impartial and established by law;
11
-the right to a public hearing and a public pronouncement of the judgment;
12
-the right to be presumed innocent until guilt is proven according to the law 13 and the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself; 14 -the right to be informed of the charge and to have adequate time and facilities to prepare one's defence including the right to have access to the proceedings and to the relevant documents supporting the charges, to choose a lawyer (if necessary, free of charge) and to communicate with him confidentially;
15
-the right to be tried without undue delay within a reasonable time;
16
-the right to be assisted by an interpreter if necessary;
17
-the right to have a convicting judgment reviewed by a higher court 18 and to demand compensation for miscarriages of justice;
19
-the right not to be tried twice for the same offence and the prohibition of retrospective legislation. 20 Closely related is the right to protection against arbitrary imprisonment and to challenge the lawfulness of one's detention as well as the right to be brought promptly before a judge. th Amendm. US Constitution, Art. 84(2) GC III, Common Art. 3(1)(d) GC. 12 Cf. Art. 14(1) ICCPR, Art. 8(5) ACHR, Art. 6(1) ECHR. 13 Cf. Art. 14(2) ICCPR, Art. 8(2) ACHR, Art. 7(1)(b) AChHPR, Art. 16 AChHR, Art. 6(2) ECHR, Art. XXVI ADRDM. 14 Cf. Art. 14(3)(g) ICCPR, Art. 8(2)(g) ACHR, Art. 16(6) AChHR, 5 th Amendm. US Constitution, Art. 99(2) GC III. 15 Cf. Art. 14(3)(a), (b), (d), (e) ICCPR, Art. 7(4) and 8(2)(c)-(e) ACHR, Art. 16(1), (3), (4) and Art. 13(2) AChHR, Art. 6(3)(a)-(c) ECHR, 17(1)(c) AChHPR, 6 th Amendm. US Constitution, Art. 99(3), 105 GC III, Art. 71, 72 GC IV. 16 Cf. Art. 14(3)(c) ICCPR, Art. 8(1) ACHR, Art. 7(1)(c) AChHPR, Art. 6(1) ECHR, 6 th Amendm. US Constitution. 17 Cf. Art. 14(3)(f) ICCPR, Art. 8(1)(a) ACHR, Art. 16(4) AChHR, Art. 6(3)(e) ECHR, Art. 105(1) GC III. 18 Cf. Art. 14(5) ICCPR, Art. 8(2)(h) ACHR, Art. 16(7) AChHR, Art. 7 Prot. 7 ECHR, Art. 106 GC III, Art. 73 GC IV. 19 Cf. Art. 14(6) ICCPR, Art. 10 ACHR, Art. 19(2) AChHR, Art. 3 Prot 7 ECHR. 20 Cf. Art. 14(7) ICCPR, Art. 8(4) ACHR, Art. 19(1) AChHR, Art. 4 Prot. 7 ECHR, Art. XXVI ADRDM, 5 th Amendm. US Constitution, Art. 67 GC IV. 21 Cf. Art. 9 ICCPR, Art. 7 ACHR, Art. 14 AChHR, Art. 6 AChHPR, Art. 5 ECHR.
Restrictions on a fair trial during trials against alleged terrorists
Military commissions
In contrast to the trials of other persons detained during an armed conflict, the Guantánamo detainees are not tried before courts-martial following the procedure of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) but before military commissions. 22 These military commissions consist of one military judge 23 and at least five military officers. 24 26 These laws, however, represent only one aspect of the legal bases regulating the detainees' status.
Fair trial restrictions
In any case, the venue of the trial -military commissions, courts-martial or civilian US courts -is not the crucial issue; rather it is its potentially negative consequences for fair trial rights. 27 While historically the main difference between courts-martial and military commissions consisted of the latter's exclusive jurisdiction over enemy aliens, 28 today trials before military commissions entail serious rights restrictions. 29 Thus, the Guantánamo detainees have only a restricted right to representation by counsel since a civilian (non-military) defence counsel is only allowed if he reaches the classified information level 'Secret' or higher. 30 The detention of the majority of the detainees has never been subjected to a substantive review. 31 The commission can change the rules on the admission of evidence as applied before general courts-martial. For instance, there is no exclusion of either evidence seized outside the US 'on the grounds that the evidence was not seized pursuant to a search warrant or authorization' 32 or of statements by the accused that are otherwise admissible 'on grounds of alleged coercion or compulsory self-incrimination so long as the evidence complies with the provisions of section 948r [the exclusion of torture evidence, self-incrimination, involuntary statements] of this title' . 33 Hearsay evidence is also admitted. 34 There is a rebuttable presumption in favour of the genuineness and accuracy of the Government's evidence. 35 Moreover, disclosure rules are restricted: for example, classified information can be excluded from disclosure. 36 Admittedly, however, the same rules apply in civilian federal courts.
37
The military judge may exclude the accused from any part of the proceeding upon a determination that, following a warning from the military judge, the accused persists in conduct that justifies exclusion from the courtroom in order to ensure the physical safety of individuals, or to prevent any disruption of the proceedings by the accused.
38
There are also doubts concerning the impartiality, independence and competence of the commission members since they are appointed by the Secretary of Defense (or another official designated by him for this purpose) and often lack judicial experience.
39
Although a good portion of the fair trial restrictions have been remedied in light of the Supreme Court's case law, 40 these remaining restrictions are still significant. 
Approaches to 'justify' these restrictions
As we have seen above (Section 2) fair trial rights are granted in both armed conflict by IHL and in peacetime by IHRL. In both situations the question arises whether -and if so to what extent -fair trial rights may be restricted. In any case, given that the GC are only applicable in armed conflict, 42 first the legal nature of the 'war on terror' has to be determined. Then one can examine whether the applicable legal regime allows for fair trial restrictions.
Is the 'war on terror' an (international) armed conflict?
An armed conflict involves armed hostilities between different (non-)state actors. 43 In case of a noninternational armed conflict a certain intensity and duration are required. 44 As to the so-called 'war on terror' the official US position is that it is fighting in a global armed conflict against al Qaeda. 45 As has been shown elsewhere 46 this is not a convincing assumption given that al Qaeda does not fulfil the requirements of an 'organised armed group' within the meaning of IHL and that the US is not at war with the states which allegedly host al Qaeda members. In any case, it is beyond dispute that the US, shortly after 11 September 2001, had been in an international armed conflict with Afghanistan which was, at that time, still governed by the Taliban. 47 This armed conflict was, however, not initiated by the attacks of 11 September 2001 since the al Qaeda pilots acted as individual (terrorist) perpetrators. 48 Instead, the Afghan conflict can be divided into three phases:
49
-With the US intervention in October 2001, the ongoing non-international conflict between the Taliban and dissident Afghan forces was turned into an international conflict with the US-led coalition fighting against the de facto Government of Afghanistan.
50
-After the fall of the Taliban, the armed conflict turned into a non-international one.
51
-This characterisation did not change with the support of the Karzai Government against the Taliban by the US-led ISAF mission in its fight against the Taliban since they acted on behalf of the Afghan Government. 
Applicable law
IHL in general
For persons detained during, or in relation to, the armed conflict against the Taliban and/or in Afghanistan IHL is applicable: 53 specifically, the GC and their Additional Protocols (AP), although only the former 54 and only they are considered, beyond controversy, as customary international law. 55 However, the GC, in particular GC III and IV, only apply, except their Common Article 3, to an international armed conflict, i.e., in this particular case until the fall of the Taliban. Afterwards, only Common Article 3 GC I-IV applies guaranteeing at least some minimal judicial guarantees. that they have received authorization, from the armed forces which they accompany, (…)'; as well as -'[i]nhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war' .
'Prisoner of war' status for alleged terrorists (GC III) or protection as civilians (GC IV
Do the Guantánamo detainees belong to one of these categories? In order to answer this question it is helpful to distinguish between al Qaeda and Taliban 56 detainees. As to the latter the Bush Administration originally took the position that they were not entitled to a prisoner of war status pursuant to GC III, since Afghanistan was a failed state and the Taliban could not be seen as a government but rather as a 'militant, terrorist-like group' . 57 From Article 4A(3) GC III and Article 43(1) AP I ('not recognized') it follows, however, that the prisoner of war status does not depend on the recognition of the adverse party but on the reasonable interpretation of these regulations. 58 If one considers the Taliban as the armed forces of the then de facto Afghan Government, 59 they clearly fall under Article 4A GC III, either as 'members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict' (Paragraph 1) or 'members of regular armed forces (…) not recognized by the Detaining Power' (Paragraph 3), or under the more comprehensive provision of Article 43(1) AP I (albeit not ratified by the US). 60 The prisoner of war status is granted irrespective of nationality. 61 In fact, the Bush Administration changed its original position and recognized the Taliban's prisoner of war status at the beginning of 2002.
62
As far as al Qaeda is concerned, one should first recall that it is an internationally organized terror organisation 63 which was founded in the late 1980s; its name meaning 'the base' . 64 It developed out of the 'mujahedeen' movement against the Soviets in Afghanistan 65 and its members became travelling warriors in conflicts involving Muslim combatants such as Somalia or Bosnia. 66 They also supported the Taliban's rise to power in the mid-1990s. 67 Their members are connected via a transnational network, which allows transnational communication, information exchange or money transfers. 68 After US interventions during the Gulf War in 1990 and Somalia in 1992, they attacked several American institutions such as the World Trade Center in 1993, US embassies in East Africa and the USS Cole in a port in Yemen, the attacks of September 11, 2001 being a kind of peak in this escalation of violence. 69 Against this background it is clear that al Qaeda as such cannot be party to the GC since it is not a state ('High Contracting Party'). 70 Yet, this does not necessarily mean that its members are not entitled to a prisoner of war status pursuant to GC III 71 since this status is, as we have seen above, not only granted to the members of state armed forces but also to non-state actors (cf. Article 4A GC III). A non-state actor could belong to a party to the conflict for the purpose of GC III if there exists at least a factual link between it and the respective conflict party. 72 However, as regards our case, neither a sufficient link between al Qaeda and the Taliban -despite some interdependencies 73 -could be identified, 74 nor did al This does not mean, however, that al Qaeda members or any other person belonging to nonstate actors who do not enjoy prisoner of war status are lacking any protection under IHL. Rather, the question arises whether they are to be considered civilians and as such protected by GC IV. To start with, Article 4(1) GC IV determines that '[p]ersons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals' . The ICRC Commentary seems to put the term 'in the hands of ' on an equal footing with 'in the territory of ' . 77 It is for this reason that some authors claim that the persons have to be 'be captured either in occupied territory or in the home territory of [a] belligerent country' . 78 This restriction, however, has no basis in the text of GC IV. The term 'in the hands of ' suggests a de facto rather than a legal status. It cannot make any difference if an alien civilian is captured on the detaining party's territory or on the one of the adversary. In particular, in times of conflict, the territorial control can vary and thus a territorial link cannot be decisive.
Article 4(3) GC IV excludes persons protected by GC III from the protection by GC IV. As the paragraph only excludes those persons from the protection of one instrument (GC IV), if they are protected by another (GC III), it implies that there is no gap in protection between GC III and IV. 79 This is confirmed by an inversion of the argument following from Article 5 GC IV. The fact that this provision restricts the rights of individuals engaged in hostile acts against the territorial or occupying power (Paragraphs 1 and 2) implies, in turn, that even these 'hostile' persons are, in principle, protected by the Convention. Indeed, Article 5 GC IV speaks of 'an individual protected person' . In any case, even if this restriction applied to al Qaeda members, their fair trial rights would remain unaffected as explicitly stated by Article 5(3) GC IV ('(…) shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention. ').
Yet, while nationality is irrelevant for the application of GC III, 80 Article 4(2) GC IV provides for a so-called nationality exception. Accordingly, it excludes from protection, inter alia, civilians who are '[n] ationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a cobelligerent State, (…) while the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are. ' This nationality exception applies to most Guantánamo detainees since they are nationals of 'neutral states' such as Yemen, Kuwait or Saudi Arabia with which the US have diplomatic relations. 81 It is therefore argued by some scholars that these Al Qaeda members are not protected by GC IV. 82 This is not convincing, though. The rationale of the nationality exception is explained with the possible protection of the respective nationals of neutral states by treaties concerning the legal status of aliens and the consular support of their home states. 83 This protection does not work effectively, however, if such nationals are detained by another power and the home states do not even know of this detention. Further, the nationality exception cannot reasonably be applied in times of occupation 84 since in this situation the diplomatic representatives are not accredited with the occupying power and therefore consular support cannot be granted. 85 An occupation of Afghan territory by the US-led ISAF forces may at least have taken place in the short period between their intervention and the fall of the Taliban Government. 86 But even if one fully applied the nationality exception to the detriment of the respective al Qaeda members at least the basic judicial rights 'which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples' (Common Article 3 GC) remain applicable. For if one accepts that these rights are granted in conflicts not covered by the GCs, one must, a fortiori, apply them to situations and cases where the Geneva Law is applicable in principle except for internal exceptions.
In a non-international conflict the just quoted Common Article 3 applies and affords a minimum standard of protection, that is, in our case, basic judicial rights 'which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples' . The Bush Administration took the opposite view arguing that Common Article 3 only applies to scenarios resembling civil war and not to (non-international) armed conflicts with international participation since this would broaden the scope of the GC and therefore amount to an amendment of the treaties without the approval of the parties. 87 Thus, 'neither the Geneva Conventions nor the WCA [War Crimes Act] regulate the detention of al Qaeda prisoners captured during the Afghanistan conflict' . 88 This view is flawed, however. First of all, as we have already argued above, in times of an international armed conflict either GC III (for prisoners of war) or GC IV (for civilians) affords protection. It follows from the rationale of the GC that each person falls into one of these categories; there is no gap in protection. 89 In particular, there can be no third category of unprotected persons during armed conflict, whatever qualifier is given to these persons (we will discuss the 'unlawful' , 'illegal' etc. combatants in a moment). In a non-international armed conflict Common Article 3 applies and it is by no means uncontroversial, as suggested by the Bush Administration, that the GC States Parties did not anticipate the situation of a non-international armed conflict with international participation, since in the drafting process reference was made to 'cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion' as special (but not conclusive) cases of a non-international armed conflict. 90 Even if the Bush Administration's suggestion were, arguendo, correct one must not overlook the fact that the intention of the drafters only constitutes a supplementary means of interpretation. 91 As a result, this means that both Taliban and al Qaeda members enjoy protection under IHL. The former are entitled to prisoner of war status pursuant to GC III, the latter enjoy the rights of Common Article 3 GC or GC IV. 
Denial of rights by means of a third category: unlawful enemy combatants?
The Bush Administration tried to deprive the detainees in Guantánamo of their IHL rights by treating them as 'unlawful enemy combatants' or 'unprivileged enemy belligerents' . 93 While this concept cannot be found in codified IHL, 94 it can be traced back to the US Supreme Court decision Ex parte Quirin in 1942 where the Court defined unlawful combatants as those who are, like lawful combatants, 'subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals' . 95 The MCA 2006 defined an unlawful enemy combatant as either 'a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces)' or 'a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal [CSRT 96 ] or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense' . 97 The decisions of the CSRT can be appealed before the District Court of Columbia. 98 Since 2009, the MCA distinguishes between 'privileged belligerents' -individuals belonging to one of the eight categories enumerated in Article 4 GC III 99 -and 'unprivileged enemy belligerents' -individuals (other than privileged belligerents) who have 'engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners' , have 'purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners' or were 'a part of al Qaeda at the time of the alleged offense under this chapter' . 100 Unprivileged enemy belligerents may not invoke the Geneva Conventions. 101 Although the MCA 2006 and 2009 employ different terminology -unlawful enemy combatants versus unprivileged enemy belligerents -the only notable difference can be seen in the fact that Taliban membership is no longer part of the more recent definition. 102 Given that the Quirin decision was delivered prior to the enactment of the GC and the unlawful combatant concept has not been adopted in the subsequent codifications, it is doubtful whether the concept can be applied in current IHL. 103 In any case, the Quirin case does not fit al Qaeda or Taliban cases at all since they are usually not accused of espionage. 104 In essence, the concept sanctions a violation of a combatant's duty not to disguise his combatant activity by masquerading as a civilian: if he does so, he loses his prisoner of war status. 105 Some scholars understand the concept more broadly, including within it those taking part in hostilities without having a right to do so, i.e. without being combatants. 106 In any case, the concept may only, if at all, limit the rights of combatants; it does not apply to civilians. 107 In addition, in a non-international armed conflict where the distinction between combatant and civilian does not legally exist but all persons are, as a matter of principle, civilians there is no room for the concept.
108
In applying these definitions to al Qaeda and the Taliban only the former could possibly have behaved unlawfully by actively taking part in hostilities without having a formal combatant status and thus a right to do so. In contrast, the Taliban belonged to the armed forces of Afghanistan and were therefore lawful combatants. 109 But even with regard to al Qaeda the exclusion of a person from prisoner of war status or any other IHL protection on the basis of mere membership of al Qaeda without taking into account the actual engagement, e.g. in hostilities, is too formalistic and arbitrary. Further, it is not compelling that everybody who 'purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners' abuses the purposes of IHL and can therefore be treated as an unprivileged or unlawful combatant. Indeed, conduct violating IHL does not entail the loss of the status as a prisoner of war but only a criminal prosecution for the respective war crimes.
110
In any case, the IHL protection cannot be removed in total. Even if one, arguendo, considers al Qaeda and Taliban members to be unlawful or unprivileged combatants, their detention has to end as soon as the hostilities are over. 111 Even if one denies the application of GC III and IV, the basic rights embodied, for example, in Common Article 3 GC and the fundamental 'laws of humanity' in the sense of the Martens Clause 112 remain applicable to the detainees' situation. 113 As to fair trial rights the US Supreme Court accepts some restrictions during armed conflict, e.g. acceptance of hearsay as proof or a presumption in favour of the Government's evidence. 114 This view conflicts, however, with the view of the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) that, pursuant to Article 14 ICCPR, even in an armed conflict the presumption of innocence and the right to defence are non-derogable rights. 115 As to military commissions the Supreme Court demanded that 'some practical need explains deviations from courtmartial practice' . 116 It further confirmed as 'judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples' that 'an accused must, absent disruptive conduct or consent, be present for his trial and must be privy to the evidence against him' .
117 The Government's 'compelling interest' in restricting the disclosure is irrelevant as long as there is no express statutory provision. 118 In conclusion, the Supreme Court's and the HRC's practice as well as the rationale of IHL, i.e., both inductive-comparative and teleological-deductive reasons, demand that even under a concept of unlawful enemy combatancy or unprivileged enemy belligerency, as a minimum, Common Article 3 GC and fundamental 'laws of humanity' in the sense of the Martens Clause apply. Thus, every person detained by US forces can invoke, as a minimum, the basic judicial guarantees including the right to a fair trial.
International human rights law
IHRL is not only applicable in times of peace but also during armed conflict. While IHL could be seen as lex specialis in the latter situation 119 this does not entail a complete suspension of human rights but, rather, that they remain applicable as 'fall-back' guarantees. 120 For the ICJ there exists a complementarity of both regimes in the form of overlapping circles. 121 Thus, the lex specialis rule is not to be understood as a rule of conflict of laws (repealing human rights law) but in terms of a hierarchy giving IHL priority but applying human rights law in a subsidiary, complementary sense. 122 For instance, human rights law has to be consulted to interpret certain guarantees provided for by IHL, e.g. the scope of the judicial guarantees in the sense of Common Article 3 GC. 123 Even if one were to give the lex specialis character of IHL a repealing effect the right to a fair trial would still be guaranteed by IHL itself, i.e., by Common Article 3 GC I-IV, Articles 84-108 GC III or Articles 64-78 GC IV. 124 In terms of human rights treaty law, first of all the ICCPR must be examined. On a regional level the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man is applicable.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The US ratified the ICCPR in 1992, Cuba only signed it in 2008. 125 While Guantánamo Bay formally belongs to Cuba, the US has full jurisdiction and control over it on the basis of a 1903 Lease Agreement with Cuba. 126 While this agreement is in line with the applicable (customary) international law and is still in force, 127 it does not change the formal territorial sovereignty of Cuba over Guantánamo which, in turn, entails that the ICCPR does not apply to this territory. This leads us to the question of a possible extraterritorial application of the ICCPR. Article 2(1) ICCPR provides:
'Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. '
128
Although the text seems to suggest a conjunctive reading of the requirements 'within its territory' and 'subject to its jurisdiction' with the result that both have to be fulfilled, 129 the HRC affirmed the extraterritorial applicability in several cases, e.g., with regard to an Uruguayan detention on Argentinian territory, 130 Iraq's human rights obligations as the occupation power in Kuwait, 131 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's responsibility for crimes committed by Serbian nationalists on the territory of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 132 and, last but not least, Israel's responsibility for human rights violations occurring in the occupied Palestinian territories. This last case is especially noteworthy, since the HRC stressed 'the exercise of effective jurisdiction by Israeli security forces' 133 and thus relied on the principle of effective control. The criteria of jurisdiction 136 and (effective) control for holding states responsible for extra-territorial human rights violations have also been confirmed within other Human Rights regimes, i.e., by the described areas of land and water, on the other hand the Republic of Cuba consents that during the period of the occupation by the United States of said areas under the terms of this agreement the united States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control over and within said areas with the right to acquire (under conditions to be hereafter agreed upon by the two Governments) for the public purposes of the United States any land or other property therein by purchase or by exercise of eminent domain with full compensation to the owners thereof.' (emphasis added).
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
137 and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC), 138 and by the ICJ in its Wall Opinion in 2004.
139
In light of these precedents the will of the States Parties is of no importance 140 and following an inductive-comparative approach, the conjunctive reading of the two elements 'within its territory' and 'subject to its jurisdiction' must be rejected. 141 Indeed, also from a teleological-deductive perspective, it would make little sense and undermine the effective human rights protection if states with effective control over extraterritorial human rights violations would be exempted from responsibility for the mere fact that these violations did not occur in their own territory. Effective control entails state responsibility because only the state which has effective control can prevent violations from occurring in the first place. 142 The only remaining question then is to what extent the effective sovereign has to implement the Covenant abroad. This, of course, depends on the scope of its control. If the respective state lacks, for example, institutions outside its territory to comply with its human rights obligations it cannot be made responsible for a failure to comply. 143 In any case, as far as the US control over Guantánamo is concerned there can be no doubt that it is effective and comprehensive as the running of the detention facility and the military commissions' trials show. Thus, the ICCPR applies extraterritorially by way of the US' effective control.
According to the wording of Article 4 ICCPR the right to a fair trial may, however, be derogated from 'in time of public emergency' . This requires, first of all, an exceptional threat, such as a war or other public emergency that threatens the life of the nation. 144 Although it is accepted that a terrorist threat can also constitute such a threat, 145 this requirement has to be interpreted restrictively. For example, the HRC stressed that even during an armed conflict a threat to the nation's life does not follow automatically. demonstrates that its recognition of the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State is exceptional: it has done so when the respondent State, through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government.' (emphasis added Instead, the threat must present a certain gravity. 147 With regard to the detention of suspected terrorists, it is therefore necessary that the terrorist threat is 'actual or imminent' , affecting the state as a whole and thereby threatening the 'continuance of the organised life of the community' so that ordinary countermeasures (permitted by the human rights treaties) are insufficient. 148 Even if one suggests that these requirements have been satisfied immediately after 9/11, it is doubtful that this should still be considered true eleven years later. 149 Apart from these doubts, the US has never notified, as required by Article 4(3) ICCPR, the UN Secretary-General of any state of emergency. 150 It can therefore be concluded that no such state of emergency allowing for a derogation from the right to a fair trial existed at any time.
Even if one assumes, for the sake of argument, that such an emergency existed or still exists it does not completely suspend all fair trial guarantees even if Article 4 ICCPR suggests doing so. On the contrary, a minimum level of rights necessary to protect non-derogable rights (such as the prohibition of torture, 151 the presumption of innocence 152 or the right to challenge the lawfulness of one's detention by way of habeas corpus 153 ) remains in force. Also, trials which may result in the death penalty must comply with fair trial standards under all circumstances. 154 What is more, the list of non-derogable rights mentioned in Article 4(2) ICCPR is not congruent with peremptory norms of international law which, given their character as 'peremptory norms' , can never be derogated from. 155 Basic fair trial rights such as the presumption of innocence or the right to defence can also be counted among these peremptory norms. While the character and status of the Declaration are controversial -it was only adopted as a 'declaration' by the Ninth International Conference of American States together with the OAS Charter 159 and thus did not originally produce any legally binding effects 160 -the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has given it a binding character being 'a source of international obligations related to the Charter of the Organization' . 161 Notwithstanding this, the US denies its binding character and insists that it does not confer any obligations. 162 Despite the US' persistent objection, 163 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has found several violations of the Declaration by the US. 164 If one agrees with the position of the IACHR and the Court, the Declaration would also bind the US and would thus oblige it to comply with minimum due process guarantees, even under a state of emergency. 
US Constitution
On the basis of, inter alia, the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution (the latter binding upon state and local governments) 166 a person can challenge his detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus, an extraordinary legal action to be brought before a judge or court. 167 A sentence can also be challenged on the ground that it was based on a violation of the Constitution. 168 A suspension of the writ is only allowed when there is a 'Rebellion or Invasion' amounting to a danger to 'public safety' (the so-called Suspension Clause). 169 The Bush Administration suggested, relying on the Supreme Court Decision in Johnson v Eisentrager, that the writ of habeas corpus is not applicable to alien detainees detained outside US territory. 170 In this case, the respondents, 21 German prisoners of war, were captured by the US Army and tried and convicted by an American military commission in China for violations of the laws of war committed there. Afterwards they were imprisoned in the American military prison in Landsberg, located in a part of Germany occupied by the US. Without being within US territorial jurisdiction at any time, they petitioned the District Court of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus because of a violation of, among other things, the Fifth Amendment and the GC 1929, in particular its Articles 60 and 63. 171 The majority of the Johnson Court denied the possibility of a writ of habeas corpus considering that the prisoners were 'at no relevant time (…) within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States' and that 'the privilege of litigation has been extended to aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their presence in the country implied protection' .
172
By invoking the formal sovereignty of Cuba over Guantánamo, as already mentioned above, the Bush Administration argued that the Guantánamo detainees could not, for the same reasons as held by the Johnson Court, petition a writ of habeas corpus. 173 Yet, while Johnson v Eisentrager certainly has precedential value, the facts of the case are different from the situation of the Guantánamo detainees.
174
The Supreme Court stressed correctly the following relevant differences: 175 First, in Eisentrager, there was no dispute that the 21 German detainees were enemy combatants and thus prisoners of war. In the relevant Guantánamo case of Boumediene, however, the petitioners contested being enemy combatants in the first place -a status that was only verified by a procedure before the CSRT. In contrast to the 'rigorous adversarial process' testing the legality of Eisentrager's detention, the CSRT proceedings fell short of those basic procedural rights which would have eliminated the need for a habeas corpus review. 176 Second, the Supreme Court could see no reason why the military mission in Guantánamo would be compromised if the petitioners' detention would be reviewed by an independent tribunal; in contrast, the allies' reconstruction and aid efforts in occupied Germany could be put at risk by such a control by US tribunals detached from the realities of the occupation. 177 Third, perhaps the most relevant difference lies in the sovereignty situation: Whereas the Landsberg prison in Germany was under the joint control of the four Allied Forces, Guantánamo lies within the non-transient and 'constant jurisdiction' of the US. 178 The Bush Administration's further argument to grant the habeas corpus right only to American citizens 179 is equally flawed, since 28 USC § 2241 also applies to foreign citizens. 180 From the historical conception as a prerogative writ, 181 focusing on those who detain and not those who are detained, 182 Of course, the exercise of a writ of habeas corpus is only a procedural means to exercise the underlying constitutional rights which have to exist in the first place. 185 The Supreme Court left the question open which constitutional rights could ultimately be invoked by the detainees. 186 To preserve the writ's effectiveness, however, the petitioner must have the possibility to invoke at least constitutional core rights, 187 e.g. the due process clause of the Fifth (and Fourteenth) Amendment.
188
Conclusion
The right to a fair trial is fully applicable with regard to alleged terrorists within the framework of the 'war on terror' . It constitutes a fundamental human right enshrined in several regimes that create an umbrella guaranteeing the basic judicial guarantees. On the international level it is guaranteed by the GC during an armed conflict, notwithstanding its international or non-international character, for both the armed forces and for civilians. During detention, as a minimum, the fundamental 'laws of humanity' in the sense of the Martens Clause and Common Article 3 of the GC are applicable. This includes 'judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples' (Article 3 (1)(d) GC). Even if one accepts the concept of unlawful combatants, the fair trial protection of the GC cannot be suspended. In times of peace the right to a fair trial is guaranteed by international human rights instruments. While they can be derogated from in times of emergency, certain minimum fair trial rights necessary to protect the non-derogable human rights continue to exist in all circumstances. Basic human rights also apply in armed conflict complementary to the IHL as lex specialis.
On the national level, the US Constitution and its Fifth Amendment are applicable even to alien citizens detained at Guantánamo Bay.
In sum, as one of the core principles of the law, the right to a fair trial can never be derogated from and must be respected in peace as well as in times of armed conflict. Thus, given its application even in extraordinary situations, it amounts to a general principle of transnational criminal law. ¶
